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Abstract
Allocation of objects or resources to competing agents is a ubiquitous problem in the real
world. For example, a federal government may wish to allocate dierent types of spectrum
licenses to telecom service providers; a search engine has to assign dierent sponsored slots
to the ads of advertisers; etc. The agents involved in such situations have private preferences
over the allocations. The agents, being strategic, may manipulate the allocation procedure
to get a favourable allocation. If the objects to be allocated are heterogeneous (rather than
homogeneous), the problem becomes quite complex. The allocation problem becomes even
more formidable in the presence of a dynamic supply and/or demand. This doctoral work is
motivated by such problems involving strategic agents, heterogeneous objects, and dynamic
supply and/or demand. In this thesis, we model such problems in a standard game theoretic
setting and use mechanism design to propose novel solutions to the problems. We extend the
current state-of-the-art in a non-trivial way by solving the following problems:
 Optimal combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders, generalizing the existing meth-
ods to take into account multiple units of heterogeneous objects
 Multi-armed bandit mechanisms for sponsored search auctions with multiple slots, gener-
alizing the current methods that only consider a single slot.
 Strategyproof redistribution mechanisms for heterogeneous objects, expanding the scope
of the current state of practice beyond homogeneous objects
 Online allocation mechanisms without money for one-sided and two-sided matching mar-
kets, extending the existing methods for static settings.
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